





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from




College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORXING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
August 15, 1980
THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS FLtNCTION AND LABOR
FORCE SIZE: A MODEL OF INVENTION FIT TO FACTS
Julian L. Simon, Professor, Departments of
Economics and Business Administration
#702
Summarv
This paper offers a micro model of the relationship of the size of the
population and the economy to productivity change. The constituents of the
model are the number of potential technology producers, the number of elements
available in the environment to stimulate invention, and the probabilistic
relationships between inventors and stimuli.
The model works out the tradeoff between the idea-stock-reducing and idea-
stock- increasing forces, under different conditions of population growth.
The model shows that under asstjmptions that seem economically and psychologically
reasonable, a larger labor force has increasing returns in technology production.
The number of possible new combinations that result from the addition of a new
idea element to the pool of technical knowledge is very large relative to the
depletion of the preexisting pool of technical knowledge by the discovery of that
one idea. And the number of such possible new combinations that a representative
additional person creates is very large relative to the additional possibilities
of duplicated effort that result from the additional person. Hence the net
result of an additional person is an increase in the total number of new ideas.
And this effect will continue with increases in total persons and total technology
until duplication approaches zero, and unduplicated idea production for the repre-
sentative person approaches the person's total capacity for idea production. Hence
there are increasing returns in idea-production to additional persons until
convergence to constant returns.
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THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS FimCTION AND LABOR FORCE SIZE:
A MODEL OF INVENTION FIT TO FACTS
Julian L. Simon*
I . INTRODUCTION
Understanding the mechanism that produces technical progress is a
vital task for economic science for several reasons: (1) Our view of
what speeds or hinders technical progress touches important policy
questions, as for example: Should a country increase immigration? And
should it subsidize capital investment? (2) Technical progress is the
key issue in growth theory. As Eltis put it in a discussion of equilib-
rium growth, "How the rate of technical progress is determined will there-
fore be a matter of the utmost importance" (1973, p. 129). (3) It is
also the most important question in the economics of population—the
underlying interest of this paper—because it determines the effect of
additional people on the standard of living of the community.
Given the importance of the topic, the paucity of attention to it
is surprising. Furthermore, the bulk of the modem attention has gone
into the question of the direction of advances in technique, whether
*Mark Browning, Jim Smith, and Gunter Steinmann gave me enjoyable con-
versation and useful ideas on the subject of this paper. Fritz Machlup
read the paper and provided valuable criticism. At his behest, I shall
strive for precision in the use of the following terms: "technology" or
the redundant "technological knowledge" shall mean the body of existing
knowledge about techniques that are useful for economic purposes, and
"technological progress" shall mean the increase in technology. "Techni-
cal progress" shall mean improvement in techniques used, and the increase
in the level of technology actually at work in the economy. I shall avoid
the use of the general word "Imowledge" which, in Machlup 's classifica-
tion, includes both technology and all kinds of other knowledge includ-
ing "spiritual, intellectual (by which [he means] useless), practical
and positive entertainment knowledge" (Correspondence, December 17, 1979).
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affected by relative intensities of capital and labor, and whether in-
fluenced by demand in particular industries or autonomous (see, for ex-
ample, the 1962 NBER volume edited by Nelson). But the more important
question from the point of view of both policy and growth theory is the
determinants of the total quantity of technical progress and the rate of
change in the level of technique.
Discussion of induced technical progress has been almost entirely
at the level of the economy, the industry, or the firm. And that makes
considerable sense because the available data are at those various levels
of aggregation, ranging from the Abramowitz-Solow-Denison tradition of
work on the components of growth, to the Rostas-Verdoom tradition of
work on industries, to the Alchian-Arrow leaming-by-doing tradition, and
the industrial-organization and organizational-behavior literatures on
firms. But there has been little discussion and less formal analysis of
induced technical progress at the level of the individual inventor and
adapter. (I shall refer to an analysis of invention at this level as a
micro-model, or a model of invention, to be distinguished from both a
more aggregated analysis of technical progress, and from a macro-model
of the economy as a whole that embodies a technical progress function.)
Without a model of the actual actors, and their interactions with each
other and with the body of e:cisting knowledge, we are talking about a
mechanism taking place in a black box, proceeding without any understand-
ing of its mode of operation.
Furthermore, the technical progress functions that have been pro-
posed in the literature—Kaldor's, Arrow's, Phelps', and others—vary
greatly in their implications, and they would not be consistent with the
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same micro-models. Therefore, a micro-analysis of invention can throw
some light upon which of the contending technical progress fimctions
and accompanying macro-models of the economy is most plausible.
An additional complication in the chain from Invention to its effect
on productivity and the standard of living is the relationship between
invention and adoption of new techniques. At any one moment there is a
large stock of useful techniques that have not been applied, and rela-
tively few inventions ever get used—1 in 1000, in Machlup's guesstimate.
And the relationship can be variable, with diminishing returns to addi-
tional inventions in the short-run. But in a long-run context, the num-
ber of potential appliers of knowledge should be proportional to the
number of inventors, and therefore, I shall assume that technical pro-
gress is a proportional function of advance in technology, without further
discussion of the relationship between them.
The aim of this paper, then, is to offer a model of the process of
technological knovrledge creation at the individual level, to see what it
implies and how it fits with the aggregate evidence and the macro-models.
Of course such a model is not likely to persuade everyone, or even most
people (though hopefully it will persuade some ) that it is reasonable.
And no one at all will think that by itself this model is adequate, or
even more than a rough beginning. But it is hoped that this model will
serve to initiate systematic discussion that will eventuate In a satis-
factory micro-model of the process of technical progress, especially in
relationship to population growth.
Section II discusses the main theoretical consideration that may
influence the relationship between technical progress and labor-force
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size and growth. Section III discusses how various macro-models in
growth theory have dealt with technical progress. Section TV constructs
a micro-model of invention relating population to advance in technology,
and considers how it fits the various macro-models of economic growth.
Section V discusses the results and qualifications of them. Section VI
concludes and sunmarizes.
II. ECONOMIC SPECULATION ON THE DETEEMINANTS
OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS FUNCTION
The earliest economic speculation on the source of technological
progress known to me is that of Petty, who emphasized the number of po-
tential inventors:
"As for the Arts of Delight and Ornament, they are
best promoted by the greatest number of emulators.
And it is more likely that one ingenious curious man
may rather be found among 4 million than 400 persons
. . . And for the propagation and improvement of use-
ful learning, the same may be said concerning it as
above-said concerning . . . the Arts of Delight and
Ornaments ..." (1682)
That is, if there are more potential knowledge creators and more minds
at work, there will be more practical ideas created and adopted. In
1960 Kuznets added important substance to this brief remark of Petty 's.
Though many of the technological progress functions that we will
discuss were originally written in terms of the rate of change of tech-
nology, it seems more concrete and therefore clearer and easier to think
about a function that has as a dependent variable the absolute numbers of
inventions and discoveries, rather than a more abstract rate of change
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which is itself a comparison of two magnitudes.* We therefore express
the Petty-Kuznets idea as
(1) \ - \.i = f c^)
where A = the level of technique in use at time t
L = labor force, considered here as proportion to total
population.
There is broad support for this formulation in the fact that there has
been more progress in those centuries and millenia when population was
greater—say the last millennium or century, compared to periods two
thousand years ago; the facts for the U.S. also show an increase in the
rate of change of productivity for this century, during which data are
available (Solow, 1957; Fellner, 1970, pp. 1112; for a summary see Simon,
1977, Chapter 4).
A more general view is that not only people but also income and a
stock of technology are important factors of technological knowledge pro-
duction. The latter matters because ideas build upon ideas. The former
matters because technology production clearly is a function of the rich-
ness of the economy, either because of the expenditures on education or
because of the variety of objects and situations people meet up with,
or—most plausibly—both. So we write
*The rate-of-change ratio Involves tx^o quantities and a comparison of
them, rather than just one quantity, which is why I believe that we
would make faster progress if the discussion focuses on the absolute
quantities. As Leontief put it: "[I]n the actual process of scientific
investigation, v/hich consists in its larger part of more or less success-
ful attempts to overcome our own intellectual inertia, the problem of
proper arrangement of formal analytical tools acquires fundamental
importance." (1966, p. 59)
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where Y = national income.
From the point of view of general policy questions, as well as so-
cial decisions about population growth, the key issue is not that of de-
ciding which sort of input factor—investment, output, or labor force,
is the most important. Rather, the key question is whether any measure
related to the size of the economy or the population has a strong effect
on productivity. This behooves us to ask: Under which conditions might
additional people not lead to increased productivity?
1. Additional people dilute the stock of capital, even if they in-
crease the stock of technology. Therefore, the trade-off between these
two forces must be studied in the context of a full economic model.
2. Some forces involved in the creation and adoption of technology
are said to be "inversely related to the rate of population groxrth
(Spengler, 1968, p. 115)." A prominent example: Faster growth and a
larger population might lead to less education per person. But the data
(Simon and Pilarski, 1979) suggest that this force does not operate
strongly in the short run. And in the long course of history so far,
this surely has not been much of a factor. Another possibility is that
faster popiilation growth reduces the rate of saving, and hence reduces
the rate at which technology, embodied in capital, is brought into use.
But the evidence on the population growth-saving relationship is very
thin.
3. Another possibility is that additional people are so much like
existing people that they are not likely to come up with any improvements
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that the existing population would not come up with. That is, people
may be sufficiently homogeneous so that additional people do not produce
additional variety in ideas. Evidence for similarity in people's think-
ing is found in the existence of independent inventions of the same idea,
e.g., stochastic dominance is a recent example in finance, modeling of
the consumer is an example in marketing, and DNA an example in biology;
patent priority fights are additional evidence. This possibility im-
plicitly assumes a limited base of existing technology which people can
develop, and a limited range of other stimuli to people's imaginations.
4. If there is a very obvious order in the value of potential pro-
jects, if people are clear-minded enough to perceive this order, and if
there is at least a fair amount of similarity in people's talents and
interests, then there would be high duplication in work on the most im-
portant inventions.
Surely there is som.e added variety introduced by additional people.
Therefore, even if there are diminishing returns in technology production,
in the very longest run an increment to technology now will have a more
positive effect on income than any decrement to capital per worker now
due to additional people, on almost any asstnnptions. The question, then,
must be: How much additional productive knowledge can we expect from
additional people, and how long will it take to overcome the negative
effects of capital dilution?
Furthermore, there are reasons to suppose that in the long run
there are increasing returns to additional persons even in technology
production itself. Kuznets makes an argument for increasing returns
on two grounds: (1) the stimulating effect of a dense environment; and
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(2) "interdependence of knowledge of the various parts of the world in
which we human being operate," (p. 328) e.g., discoveries in physics
stimulate discoveries in biology, and vice versa. And he discounts the
possibility of diminishing returns because "the universe is far too vast
relative to the size of our planet and what we know about it" (p. 329).
Machlup suggests that "every new invention furnishes a new idea for
potential combination with vast nvunbers of existing ideas
. . . [and]
the number of possible combinations increases geometrically with the
number of elements at hand" (1962, p. 156). It is this latter idea of
an increasing number of permutations of elements of knowledge as the
stock increases that seems most compelling to me, when put together with
the idea of a reduced possibility of duplicate discoveries as the number
of possibilities increases faster than the number of potential technology
producers. And we shall see later that—contrary to intuition—duplica-
tion of intellectual effort is likely to be less and less of a constraint
with the passage of time and with larger populations. Eventually we can
expect the main constraint to be an individual's idea-production capacity
alone, while the duplication factor will be negligible.
Compelling evidence on the contribution of additional people would
seem to be found in the aggregate evidence on productivity—inter-country
and intra-industry comparisons, as well as leaming-by-doing. It seems
inescapable to me that this implies that more persons lead to more tech-
nical progress through more individuals producing technical knowledge.
But many others are quite unwilling to accept this as proof that more
workers raise productivity. Therefore we must investigate the process
at the individual level, to build a model and to speculate about reason-
able parameters to see how they jibe with the aggregate evidence.
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III. TECHNICAL PROGRESS FUNCTIONS IN GROWTH THEORY
Most economists have assumed—explicitly or implicitly—that tech-
nical progress is in fact independent of the size of the economy and
the population.
As Ansley Coale put it:
[T]here is no warrant for the assumption that growth
and knowledge is greater with a larger population.
• • •
I think even the most cursory consideration of
scientific or more general cultural history would
bring to light too many counter examples to make
this theory tenable. I have gifted and well-informed
friends who seriously think that the intellectual
heights achieved in classical Athens have never been
equalled, and this was a community of a few thousand
educated persons. The population of Florence at the
time of the Renaissance was no greater than Trenton,
New Jersey, yet Galileo was one of the key figures
in the development of modem science; the Medici and
their fellow bankers were pioneers in the development
of modem banking, including double entry book-keeping;
Dante is a figure in world literature rivalled only by
Shakespeare and possibly Homer; Machiavelli is consid-
ered by some the godfather of political science, and
in painting, sculpture, architecture and engineering
the Florentines led the world. One could plausibly
argue that this community of a hundred thousand per-
sons did more for modem civilization in a few centuries
that the U.S. has. Elizabethan London and Budapest
between the two world wars (in fact, the Jewish com-
munity in Budapest) are other examples.
(Correspondence, December 28, 1971).
For years this assumption was made operational by simply omitting tech-
nical progress from mathematical discussions of growth. T^^len technical
progress was finally introduced explicitly, it was brought in as a con-
stant function of time. And in the context of the discussion of popula-
tion growth almost no one says that greater population should mean faster
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technical progress* by the action of additional lainds—even though it
is a well-accepted fact that productivity increases as a function of
total output through learning-by-doing, and though productivity obviously
is affected by basic science and R&D activity in the past.
In 1949 Verdoorn speculated that "a change in the volume of pro-
duction . . . tends to be associated with an average increase in labour
production" (1949-1979, p. 1), division of labor being the process he
had in mind. And he showed a long-run historical relationship in various
countries between the rate of increase in total product and the rate of
increase in productivity. Verdoorn' s technical progress function is
• •
(3) A = aY
or
r-> ^
^t " ^t-1 7t-l " V2 ,(3a) —r = a( = )
\-l S-1
where A = the level of technique
Y = gross national product
- a dot indicates a rate of change
a = constant.
But Verdoorn did not deal with the question of the direction of causa-
tion, that is, whether faster technical progress causes faster economic
growth rather than (or in addition to) the converse. Verdoorn's function
also has the unlikely property of implying that if there is zero economic
*Even Milton Friedman, whose perception of basic economic forces is
usually keen, did not accept Kuznets' proposition that more minds mean
faster growth of productivity, when commenting on the 1960 article in
which Kuznets advanced this idea (Friedman, 1960, "Reply", pp. 349-350).
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growth there would be zero technical progress. In a definitional sta-
tistical sense this may well be true. But behaviorally we can be sure
that some invention and innovation occurs even in the absence of measured
economic growth, as seen in the famous Homdal effect.
Kaldor (1957) picked up Verdoom's notion, dubbed it a "law", and
introduced it into his growth theorizing. But in his writings he turned
from output to capital investment as the determinant of technical pro-
gress. His original function was:
(A) A=a(K),
where K = capital
and from it Kaldor concluded (incorrectly) that population growth would
have a neutral or negative effect on the growth of income per capita.
He also made no note of a possible positive effect of a larger total
population through the Petty effect. And as with Verdoom's function,
if investment is zero, technical progress is zero, an unlikely outcome.
Kaldor (with Mirrlees) later worked with the function
(4a) A = a(-|)
That is, "the annual rate of growth of productivity per worker ...[ is
]
a function of the rate of growth of investment per worker" (Kaldor and
^a.rrlees, 1962/1970, p. 309). This function shows population growth
and size to be even less favorable than (4)
.
Eltis' technical progress function differs somewhat from Kaldor's,
being (1973, p. 151)
-12-
^t ~ ^t-1
(5) A = a ( ^ ^
^ h
As does Kaldor's, Eltis' function has the property that though it varies
over the business cycle, it implies a constant long-run rate of change
of technical progress,* which may or may not be reasonable, as we shall
discuss later. An unrealistic feature of Eltis' model is that it compre-
hends only embodied technical progress (p. 18); disembodied technical
progress must be at least as important.
Alchian took note of the fact that production of such products as
airframes improves in the course of production. He then introduced this
"learning-by-doing" insight into economic theory, distinguishing among
various sorts of economies of scale (1949/1963; 1959). Arrow built an
explicit technical-progress function upon this foundation. Like Kaldor
he shifted from output to capital as the carrier (or the proxy for the
carrier) of embodied technical progress, but unlike Kaldor's, his capi-
tal stock variable was intended to be a proxy for ctimulative output:
(6) A = aK^
where b is a constant analogous to the coefficient of serial numbers in
learning-by-doing studies, and is of the order of .2, Arrow's technical-
progress function has a variety of defects for the understanding of the
effects of different population sizes and growth rates, however, some
stemming from the inherent ambiguities in the capital concept, some
stemming from the alteration in meaning with the shift in variables from
*If profits decline, hov7ever, the rate of progress can increase, in
Eltis' model.
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output (the empirical basis for the learning-by-doing phenomenon) to
capital; these matters are discussed in another paper (Simon, 1979a),
Also, as with Kaldor's laodel (vhich Arrow calls similar to his own),
stable production implies no learning-by-doing and no technical progress,
which Arrow himself notes is contrary to the Horndal effect and similar
evidence elsewhere.
Shell (1966) wrote a function in which the stock of technical knowl-
edge in use is a proportional function of current output (less the decay
in knowledge, which can be disregarded here)
(7) A^ = aY^.
The constant a here reflects both the R&D level and the industry success
rate of inventions. This function suffers from several drawbacks, in-
cluding the mutual influence of A and Y, and the implication that A will
decline if Y declines and will not increase if Y is constant. Putting
absolute A rather than a change in A on the left side does not seem a
promising way to model the Invention process at the micro-level.
An attractive function is that of Phelps (1966)
^t ~ ^t-1 ^t-1
(8) A = 7 = h (,— ) where h is concave.
^
^t ^t-1
This function has an increasing A even with stationary population, which
is realistic, and it has steady-state properties, which makes it
esthetically pleasing. It has a constant A with constant L, or
decreasing A with decreasing L, (the latter running contrary to
Western experience in the 20th century). Phelps' model also has the
property—unmentioned by Phelps—that the rate of growth is a monotonic
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posltive function of population growth; this is a startling contradiction
of all conventional growth theory.
The models described above are summarized in Table 1, where we see
that they differ from each other and from the historical facts in a
variety of ways. A sound micro-model of invention should help us decide
which technical progress function is most to be preferred.
Table 1
IV. A MICRO-MODEL OF INVEOTION
At any moment there are L workers in the economy, all of whom are
potential creators of new technical knowledge. These workers differ in
their propensities to invent and innovate, and one could differentiate
them in the model. But that woxild introduce complication without chang-
ing the conclusions.
Let us first notice that no matter what assumptions one makes about
the composition of the "original" population—about the homogeneity, and
about the distribution of characteristics—an increment of people similar
in composition to the original people will increase the number of ideas by
that same proportion _if_ the original group and the incremental group
are exposed to different but equally-potent stimuli. That is, if people
and stimuli are all that go into idea-making, the function is homogenous
of degree one. There may be individual sluggards and individual big
producers, but each kind will be found in each group. Critical-minimum-
sise groups may be necessary to produce some kinds of ideas, but this
will be true in the same way for the original as for incremental groups.
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In brief, the only constraint or factor that might lead to diminishing
returns to additional people in idea production (leaving aside education
and capital for now) is the size of the stock of knowledge that is avail-
able in common to the potential idea producers. This means—somewhat
surprisingly—that we do not need to know anything about the degree
of similarity of additional people to existing people in order to know
how additional people will increment the flow of ideas.
New technology is built upon the stock of technology and other
stimuli, i.e., the number of bits of information (H ) , in the environ-
ment at moment t. This is the key idea and the fundament of this analy-
sis. And there are txro relevant aspects of the stock of technology that
may be used for creating new ideas. On the one hand, when an idea is
created, that idea is removed from the universe of possible new ideas
still to be discovered. And if ten more people come along and re-discover
the idea independently, nothing is gained; here we find the operation of
a process of diminishing returns to additional ideas.* On the other hand,
newly-discovered ideas also add to the stock of elements that may be
combined with other elements to create still other new ideas. Surely
this describes the history of human economic and intellectual growth.
Newton's and Einstein's, Smith's and Malthus' and Keynes' discoveries
depleted the stock of those potential ideas, but opened up vast fields
*Even when there is duplication, the result is not pure waste. The
double exposure increases the chances of the idea being accepted and
put into use. And the two discoveries are likely to reveal somewhat
different aspects of the phenomenon.
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of possibility for future discoveries.* Discoveries about Indexes and
national income accounts removed those fish from the pond of potential
discoveries in economics, but left their eggs to spawn large numbers of
new fish which could not have previously hatched. The creation of new
economic data—a result of more people and nore income in a country
—
removes the opportunity to do this for the first time, but greatly en-
hances the possible ntmber of other studies a contemporary economist
can do. The research that required brilliance of Adam Smith or John
Graunt or William Petty can now be done routinely by us. And an article
by Arrow or Becker or Markowitz or Schultz or Stigler can—fortunately
or unfortunately—spawn a career industry.
Let H.7 be an idea formed of the combination of two different
stimuli, j and j, coning from the set j = l,2,3,...m of stimulus
elements existing as of t. To be a new idea, this combination jj must
never have occurred before, which also means that it is not itself
found as an element in set j = l,2,...,m . (A fuller treatment would
also consider the higher order combinations, H ~~, but here we may
neglect them.)
The stock of technology available at any moment consists of the
stock of technology at the beginning of the prior period plus the new
ideas created in that period, Z>
^,.4.1 = ^- H.. ^I plus all H, ~ newly
jj jj '^^ ^^
appearing in t. And each new idea is thereby added to the stock of stimuli
*In a recent discussion of a nuclear power plant emergency, Royster
commented, "The experience should be humbling. It should give us
pause. It should remind us of an eternal truth; the more we know, the
more the mystery, the more we have to learn." Wall Street Journal
,
April 11, 1979, p. 22.
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available as building blocks for idea-creation in subsequent periods.
Notationally, each E, ~ occurring in t becomes a j in t+1.
We shall assume that during each period, each person i among the
persons in the labor force L produces exactly one combination of j and
j , a random drawing without replacement (for that drawing) from J^- H .
.
In reality, people differ considerably in the numbers of ideas they create,
but (as discussed earlier) this XiTill be seen not to affect the model if we
notice intuitively that a partition of the labor force into the same
proportional divisions each year of idea producers (one idea) and non-
idea producers (zero) would not affect the model (nor would a more con-
tinuous distribution)
.
It would also be realistic to assume that the flow of ideas per
representative person increases over the years, both because more educa-
tion likely leads to more productive ideas, and also because there is,
to my knowledge, no evidence that scientific production is declining in
output per person.* And we see ever-increasing flows of new products,
and of such additional carriers of new information as magazines and
j oumals
.
Our ultimate aim is to learn how the number of potential idea-
producing persons (the labor force) affects the growth of the stock
of technology. For economic purposes we will want to know whether the
additional ideas produced by additional workers will be sufficient to
*This does not apply to the output of a given person over his or her
career, but rather to a comparison of similar persons at the same ages
in successive cohorts. For a recent review of relevant data in the
physical sciences, see Rescher (1978).
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counterbalance the negative effect of additional persons on the supply
of capital per person.
The nvmber of ideas that might be discovered at time t is
t-1 j=l
(9) M = m(m - 1) - E I U .T
^
t-~ j= ^'^^
and we assume that if a person first hits on an idea that has previously
(not concurrently) been discovered—the negative part of the left-hand
side of the above expression—the person will simply "throw the fish back"
and find another hitherto-undiscovered idea, but one which may be con-
currently discovered by another person. M is a simplified symbol for
this concept.
The probability that a combination jj is a new idea is the pro-
portion of all possible m(m-l) combinations that have not previously
been discovered
^^^^




The probability of duplication or "overlap"—the probability that a given
new jj xd.ll be discovered by more than one person in the same period—is
roughly the ratio of the number of other people in the "discovery" labor
force, L , to the total number of possible undiscovered ideas, M , or
L /M . Therefore the total number of new ideas that will be discovered
in a given period, not counting duplicates or higher-order overlaps more
than once, is
t-1
m(m-l) - Z K
t L j=m
<^^-^ K^ rnfrJT ^ (1 " ^) = - H. ,7 't m(m-l) M^ t,jj
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The total stock of ideas M at the end of period t is
t-1
(12) M = z r, H .: + i_ H .:
t
,.„ j^ t.jj J.
t.jj
Intuitively we can see that the proportion of overlap will diminish
each year because in successive years each new idea-element can combine
with a larger number of existing stimuli-elements, as Machlup (1962)
noticed. A bit more precisely, the number of elements that is added to
the set m each year is almost L , and therefore the number of new possible
combinations is almost L m^—or better, [L^ , + L^]m^, where the dot indi-
t t ' t-1 t t
cates the rate of growth, whereas the number of possible overlaps rises
• •
only from a bit less than L , to a bit less than I. , roughly L . If I.t-1 t' 6 ^ t t-
is 2% of L , then L m is 50n as large as L , a very large factor of
t t t t t
multiplication no matter what number—a million, a thousand, or a
trillion—one assigns to m . Given this very large rise in the ratio of
to-be-discovered elements relative to the number of potential overlaps,
in a relatively short time the number of ideas per period will approach
the number of persons, as E« K .T ^ L . We Vjxow this is not in fact
true because people do not work on ideas across the spectrum of possi-
bilities, but cluster where the "action" is. But if the size of cluster
remains the same from year to year, we can replace "idea" with "cluster"
in our thinking without changing the results.
This analysis implies that there are increasing returns in tech-
nology creation from additional people, until the process tapers off to
constant returns. This implies that additional people imply additional
technology, without limits. And because an increment of technology has
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a cumulative effect in raising income through its effect on output and
capital formation, a proportional increase in technology in t comes to
have a more-than-proportional positive partial effect on income in t + x.*
V. THE MICRO-MODEL OF IWENTION EMBEDDED
IN A GROWTH MODEL OF THE ECONOMY
There is nothing in the productivity-increasing micro-model that
is a counter-balancing disadvantage to the clear tendency for a larger
labor force to produce a faster rate of productivity increase. But if
we embed the micro-model into a macro-model of the economy, we find
that capital dilution works in the opposite direction, more workers
implying less capital per worker, ceteris paribus. Therefore we must
construct and manipulate the combined model in order to determine how
the tradeoffs operate under various conditions.
We begin with the simplest conventional Cobb-Douglas production
function:
(13) Yj. = Aj.lJk^, a + g = 1
The labor force grows at a rate that will be varied for experimental
purposes
*I have implicitly been assuming that technology is permanent and does
not obsolesce. To some extent technical knowledge does obsolesce, as we
know it does from decreases in use of journals and books with the passage
of time (e.g., Fussier and Simon, 1969; but note that some old technical
knowledge remains in use by way of being embodied in newer ideas, an effect
which does not show up in readership statistics, and from the diminution
of patents kept in force (Nordhaus, 1969; but notice that these patent-
maintenance data also simply show patents which were finally proven to
have no use and be unprofitable, and hence are dropped). To this extent,
the analysis must be modified. Obsolescence would seem to make additional
people relatively more valuable because the essence of technology pro-
duction is its external effect. But this needs further study.
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(14) Lj. = L^._^ + dLj._^.
Net saving may be treated as a fixed proportion of output
(15) K^ = Vi + kY^_^.
The micro-model may be built in by equating the level of technique A
with the stock of technology M . Simulations with a wide variety of
parameters, and a technical progress function with specifications con-
sistent with the model given above—for example, M - M = f(L ,M )
or = f[L*M'^(|-)^] or = f [L'''(f)^]~all show that higher population
J-i Li
growth yields a higher present value of future consumption at discount
rates at least up to 6% (to be compared to the historical 2-3% pure rate
of discount); the details are given in another paper (Simon, 1979b).
VI. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AITO QUALIFICATIONS
1. Not all ideas that might be discovered have the same potential
quality and value. If people came upon ideas only by chance, this non-
equality would not in any way affect the workings of the model given
above. But people prefer to produce high-value ideas rather than low-
value ideas. If it were also the case that people could also identify
the possible high-potential ideas with perfect accuracy, then—if there
were no differences among people in interests and skills—every potential
technology-producer would be working on the sane potential idea at a given
moment. If there were also a reasonably high likelihood that a random
person would succeed in making the discovery of this highest-value idea,
then diminishing returns to additional persons would be sharp.
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To obtain a satisfying understanding of this nechanism would require
a fuller model. Such a model would not be easy to construct. More im-
portant, however, qualitative estimates of the relevant parameters are,
to my knowledge, both non-existent at present and extraordinarily
difficult to produce in the future. The best that we can do at present
is to discuss the natter qualitatively and to try to compare the over-
all results against the aggregate facts, which I will do in that order.
Diminishing returns due to concentration of efforts on the same
research project requires, first of all, that all persons have the
ability to work in the same general area, and that intellectual mobility
is total. But this is clearly not the case. The mature individual who
shifts from one major area to another (e.g., from economics to biology
or psychology, or the reverse) is rare, and even shifting between minor
areas (e.g, public finance and population economics) is not very common.
Furthermore, there is proliferation of areas within which people study
and later work, so there may not even be a greater number of effective
competitors than in the past; for example, Plato and Aristotle, and Bentham
and Hume and Smith, took much of human knowledge as their playground,
talked to others interested in all these subjects, and made fimdamental
contributions in all of them; this sort of behavior is much less likely
today. It might even turn out (if one were to examine membership lists
of professional organizations over hundreds of years) that one's primary
professional organization has grown no bigger, e.g., the AFEA or the PAA
now versus the AEA at the turn of the century. If the size of "non-
competing groups" has not gro\TO over the years, this would be enough to
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dispatch the worry of dininlshing returns from increasing concentration
on the idea with the highest potential value.
Second, diminishing returns from increasing concentration of workers
requires ability among workers in a given field to spot the highest-
potential projects. Such perfect prevision is far from the rule; even
the most eminent men disagree on which areas are most worthy of attention.
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that many important ideas are not
come upon even though the intellectual preconditions and the need for
the idea are present. One example is dynamic programming, which could
have been developed and used centuries before it was invented. Another
example, according to Weinberg (1977, p. 6), is the set of "discoveries
of the recession of distant galaxies and of a weak radio static filling
the universe. This is a rich story for the historian of science, filled
with false starts, missed opportunities, theoretical preconceptions,
and the play of personalities."
Third, people would have to be willing to practice a strategy of
working on the project with highest potential but also greatest com-
petition. If researchers are anything like Hotelling's spatial retail
competitors, or Downs' political competitors, or several theorists'
television-program competitors, they will recognize that it can make
sense to move away from the highest-potential area of the market in
order to face less competition. Certainly we see this in some areas of
science: India and Brazil are of greater importance on the world scene
than are Ceylon and Guyana, but some students (even those from the US
or USSR) work on the smaller rather than on the larger of them.
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Uith regard to the first three points above, it should be noted
that we don't know much about how people pick topics to work upon.
Some are attracted by large concentrations of workers; others are attract-
ed by empty areas. Some are influenced by the scientific literature;
others—like Keynes in the 1930' s—are influenced by the news and the
events of the day. Some are influenced by ideas, others by physical
objects. Some people like low-risk projects, others are less risk averse.
About all we safely say for sure—but this is important—is that there
is great variety in people's topic-choosing behavior, as may be seen
from the fact that seldom will two members of an academic department
be working on the same problem with the same tools and for the same
purpose.
Fourth, concentration of workers on a given problem is only a cause
of diminishing returns if the likelihood of any one person being success-
ful is great enough so that the likelihood of more than one being suc-
cessful is meaningfully large. And if this were really the case, then
simultaneous duplicate production of important ideas would be seen fre-
quently; it is not, in my observation.
Fifth, for concentration to be a cause of diminishing returns,
communication among workers in the same general areas would have to be
sufficiently slow so that a person who might work on a potential dis-
covery would not be warned off by the just-previous success of another.
All of us have had the experience of contemplating working on an idea,
checking the literature and the field of allied workers, and finding
out that in fact it has been done. This is not counter-productive
duplication, because the resources devoted to the initial insight are
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relatively small, and can often be redeployed on the basis of the knowl-
edge of what the other person has already discovered. Given that the
speed of relevant scientific communication is almost surely increasing,
safeguards against duplication of work on the highest-potential ideas
(as well as lower-potential ideas)
.
We are only interested in the above set of possibilities if all of
them are each present to high enough degree to together cause increasing
duplication of effort with growing numbers of people. Therefore, an
aggregate test is fair: The numbers of persons eligible to make dis-
coveries have been increasing. But the rate of duplication of discovery
of the greatest ideas shows no clear direction toward greater duplica-
tion. The Leibniz-Newton conjuncture is the last great incident I know
of; and, has anyone argued that the circrmistances surrounding the dis-
covery of DNA indicate that too much talent was devoted to the task?*
Y
The key issue here is the concavity of fCM) or f(lI,L) or f(M,L,—), upon
which the number of duplications throw light, but there seems to be no
increase in that concavity.
Another relevant test is the rate of investment in R&D: The very
long-run trend is up rather than down, even in percentage-of-GNP terms
as well as in absolute terms. Of course this might reflect increasing
supplies of potential investors. But it is also consistent with an in-
crease in profitable research opportunities, and hence with decreasing
duplication.
*It seems as if one could profitably classify discoveries into those
that were foreseen by many (e.g., DNA) and those that were not (e.g.,
relativity). TThether this is so, and what it might imply, is not
obvious.
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Still another line of evidence refers to the number of first-rate
profitable opportunities for research, rather than to the rate of dupli-
cation itself. If the nxnnber is very large, then duplication of top
possibilities is not a problem, Hera are a few quotations that indicate
the possibilities lying in wait for the idea-producer:
Cancer researcher Cole: "It's not so much a question of more
money to look at the problem, as a lack of people
and analytical tools for the Job." (Blakeslee, 1979).
Newton: "I do not know what I may appear to the world; but
to myself I seem to have been only like a boy, play-
ing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself, in now
and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier
shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth
lay all undiscovered before me." (quoted by Taylor
and Wheeler, 1966, p. 187).
Bethe (on nuclear fusion): "Money is not the limiting factor:
the annual support in the U.S. is well over $100
million, and it is increasing steadily. Progress
is limited rather by the availability of highly
trained workers, by the time required to build
large machines and then by the time required to
do significant experiments." (Bethe, 1976, p. 2)
It may also be useful to examine the lengths of time between dis-
coveries that seem equal-importance landmarks in a given field. For
example, one could list and measure the times between Ptolemy, Copernicus,
Newton, Lorentz and Einstein. The decreasing intervals suggest that
great discoveries in physics were not becoming increasingly hard to make.
Tvhen thinking about diminishing returns in technology production,
it is important to distinguish whether the subject is technology in the
small or in the large—that is, advances in technology with respect to
a narrowly-defined topic, or technology pertaining to productivity in a
wide field or in the economy as a whole. Consider the interesting data
in Figure 1. There we see that the rate of technological progress with
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respect to any given type of particle acceleration has been much slower
than the rate of technological increase in all types of particle accel-
erations taken together. Clearly there would be much more sharply di-
minishing returns to additional researchers working on any one type of
acceleration than with respect to particle generators as a set. And
there would be even less diminution of returns to additional workers in
nuclear physics in all its breadth.
Figure 1
2. The subject of the discussion so far has been the quantity of
technology production. The reader may wonder whether the quality may
decline even if the quantity does not. This is a difficult question.
It may even be logically impossible to determine the value of later
discoveries relative to earlier ones, because the later discoveries
depend upon the existence of the earlier ones. This implies that part
of the value of the later discoveries should be attributed to the earlier
ones, and there is no meaningful way to make this partition. It is like
the steps in a ladder: One can put a value on the benefits rendered
by the first rung along, but part of the benefit gained from the use of
the second rung must be attributed to the first rung.
One possible avenue of inquiry is judgmental: We may ask questions
such as: Was Einstein's contribution less valuable than Newton's?
Newton's less than Ptolemy's or Archimedes? Some of this has implicitly
been done in the lists that have been made of the "great" discoveries
by century (see the summary in Sorokin, 1937). But of course such lists
Figure I
ENERGIES ACHIEVED BY PARTICLE ACCELERATORS






Nou The Kftwflmtial growth of accelerators was first noted by John P. Blewett
i^^ in an Internilr Ripwc^fthe Cosmotron Di n iiliiii III nfll Iih ii i ii
,r
-
National Laboratory, daleJ JdMgftolS^^The first public presentation of
jsf
_
this material was ma^fi^rfP^rmi in his nhln "' n iilijmL I'm iiIi ill at the
W^.- AmericanPJjysfEalSociety meeting in January, 1954^TJi?T»»u(sis from
'
.
M;^^S..H:rivingston and J. P. Blewett, Particle Accelerators (New>«nk,
From ' M. Stanley Livingston, Panicle Accelerators: A Brief History (Cambridge,
1 1969), p. HI.
\
-28-
are biased by difficulties in time separation between event and judges,
as well as by the judges' (Western) cultural background.
A relevant fact is the relationship of the rate of technology accre-
tion to the rate of productivity increases. The quantity of scientific
literature has been doubling at a rate which has been fairly constant
for a long time. Price (1961, p. 119) estimates that "normal exponential
growth" since 1660 has been a constant doubling every thirty years
(whereas before that 120 years were required for doubling) . On the other
hand, productivity has been increasing at an increasing rate, as dis-
cussed by Solow (1957) and Fellner (1970). The latter observation seems
inconsistent with the idea that the "quality" of economic literature
has been decreasing, or even remaining constant; rather, a constant
doubling in the quality of literature together with an increased rate
of productivity suggests an increase in economic productivity per unit
of scientific literature (taking the latter as a proxy for all knowledge
produced)
.
3. So far we have assumed that the rate of idea production
(duplicated plus unduplicated) is the same for representative persons
under all conditions. But we know—from statistical as well as casual
evidence (Price, 1971; Love and Pashute, 1978)—that the production of
technical-advance ideas is a positive function of per-capita income.
Building in this effect of income on idea production will only amplify
the results shown without it.
Of course each and every fact and line of thought in this section
is speculative at best, and irrelevant at worst. But this proves, more
than anything, how ill-formed and uninvestigated is this topic. Any
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discusslon, crude that it may be, may be a useful starting point in
such conditions.
As long as we think of technology as scientific knowledge in itself,
we are not likely to reach a persuasive answer. But if we keep in mind
that our interest here is in the output of economic welfare, we may be
able to make some f)rogress. We still will have major difficulties if
we think in terms of GNP per capita as it is usually measured, because
GOT measurement is itself affected by technological change in a variety
of well-known ways. But it may be reasonable to examine the changes
over time in a few key elements of economic welfare that seem reason-
ably comparable.
Consider grain output, for example. Its level of production tech-
nology in an economy is related to the level of other production tech-
nology, and it is old enough a product so that it is not in a spectacular
early-development period. Yet the rate of productivity increase has
been increasing, and there seems no reason to doubt that the amount of
human labor involved in grain production per capita xd.ll continue to
diminish in the foreseeable future, and perhaps at an increasing rate
(e.g., dropping 1% of its manpower in the first equal period under dis-
cussion, 1.17= in the second period, and so on, an infinitely sustainable
process until the last farmer). This is at least measurable, and it is
a reasonable proxy for the combined quantity and quality of technical
knowledge. If the change in the level of productivity of all other pro-
ducts is similar to that of grain, this suggests that a given amount of
product can be attained by an amount of work tine that will diminish
at an increasing rate, while leisure—a key element of economic
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welfare—will Increase. There is an upper bound to the amoiint of lei-
sure, of course. But if the amount of leisure is held constant and more
types of goods are producted, economic welfare could continue to increase
at an increasing rate.*
VII. WHICH TECHNICAL PROGRESS FUNCTION DOES
THE MICRO-MODEL OF INVENTION FIT?
We are now in a position to consider which technical-progress models
in the literature best fit the micro-model set out above.
Quite obviously, there is no warrant here for technical progress
being driven purely exogenously, or being considered simply a function
of time. And this model does not fit Arrow's learning-by-doing model,
which could be written
(5a) M^ - M^_^ = a K^ - K^^.,
or by a more straightforward learning-by-doing model such as
t=T , t=T-l ,
(12) M - M = a[( Z YJ^ - ( Z Yj'']
t=0 ^ t=0
The micro-model views technical progress as a fimction of human activity
together with the stock of technology, perhaps in conjunction with the
level of education; the learning-by-doing models are purely em.pirical
in their origin, and no techno logy-producing mechanism is suggested for
them. And everything said about learning-by-doing models pertains just
as well to the Verdoorn model
*Life expectancy is an economic good at least as valuable as leisure
and GNP goods. And I see no prospect of it increasing at an increasing
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and the Kaldor model
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Furthermore, the Verdoom, Arrow, and Kaldor models have different im-
plications than the nicro-models as can be seen in Table 1.
The best fit to the micro-model is a transformation of Phelps' (1966)
function, which can be written here as
(7a) M^ - M^_^ = faJ_;L^lJ_i), *,<!' < 1.
In the limit of the micro-model this becomes
(7b) M^ - M^_^ = f (lJ_^)
which may be viewed as equation (7a) with i|; ->• 0. The Phelps function
also fits nicely with a function that brings in the level of education
through the income level
(7c) M^ - M^., . f[Ltl«ll(l)tl'-
Or if one thinks that the aggregate income of a country should be seen as
an additional proxy for the aggregate knowledge available to be worked
with, and that this should be brought into the function along with per-
capita income, the technical progress function may be written
Rather surprisingly, technical progress functions (7c) and (7d) maintain
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all the key growth-theoretic features of Phelps' function (7a) until the
sum of the exponents L and Y becomes much higher than a function homo-
geneous of degree one; the characteristics of the models are explored
elsewhere (Simon, 1979b) . And all of these functions are consistent
with the micro-model of invention developed in this paper, at various
stages of technical progress. This suggests that fimctions (7a) - (7d)
should be considered the main candidates for inclusion in growth-theoretic
and population-policy macro-models.
CONCLUSION
For hundreds of years economists and others have recognized that
a larger population and faster population growth seem to be found where
individual income is high and rising. But at the same time, the simplest
sort of theoretical reasoning suggested exactly the opposite conclusion.
It is obvious—Malthus only formalized the notion—that in the shortest
run, during which all capital and inventory are fixed, more people imply
lower average incomes because there are more mouths to eat up the inven-
tory, and more hands per unit of productive capital. It is, however,
almost as obvious—except, perhaps, to some economists—that after some
long run, additional people lead to higher per-worker output and per-
capita income through increases in productivity due to human invention
and adoption, an idea stated by Petty and vigorously restated by Kuznets.
In the past two decades, several lines of empirical evidence have
shown increases in productivity due to increased technology, market size,
and total output. These include the Abramovitz-Solow-Denison components-
of-growth studies, the learning-by-doing studies, the studies cf comparative
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growth in market size starting with Rostas, and recent studies of pro-
ductivity by size of city by Sveikauskas, Segal, and Love.
All the existing empirical evidence, however, is at the level of
the economy or the industry. Still lacking—aside from Petty 's simple
suggestion—is an empirical or theoretical tinderstanding at the micro
level of why a larger population and a bigger economy should lead to
increased productivity. The task of this paper is to propose such a
theoretical model. The constituents of the model are the number of
potential technology producers, the number of elements available in the
environment to stimulate invention, and the probabilistic relationships
between inventors and stimuli.
The model works out the tradeoff between the idea-stock-reducing
and idea-stock-increasing forces, under different conditions of population
growth. The model shows that under assumptions that seen economically
and psychologically reasonable, a larger labor force has increasing
returns in technology production. The number of possible new combina-
tions that result from the addition of a new idea element to the pool of
technical knowledge is very large relative to the depletion of the pre-
existing pool of technical knowledge by the discovery of that one idea.
And the number of such possible new combinations that a representative
additional person creates is very large relative to the additional possi-
bilities of duplicated effort that result from the additional person.
Hence the net result of an additional person is an increase in the total
number of new ideas. And this effect will continue with increases in
total persons and total technology until duplication approaches zero,
and unduplicated idea production for the representative person approaches
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the person's total capacity for idea production. Kence there are in-
creasing returns in idea-production to additional persons until conver-
gence to constant returns.
As to the qiiality (or value or importance) of additional ideas
with a larger rate of growth of the labor force and higher rates of
increase of technology, there is no statistical evidence to suggest that
quality is decreasing. On a priori grounds one might speculate, rather,
that effective quality is increasing, because of the larger number of
existing ideas and capital with which a new idea can interact and be
fruitful. But it is logically impossible to evaluate the economic con-
tribution of later ideas separately from the contribution of earlier
ideas.
The model also considers the trade-off between an additional person's
positive contribution in technology and the person's negative effect on
per-worker output due to the Malthusian element of capital dilution. An
increase in workers must surely lower individual income in the short run
due to capital dilution, but after some time the effect comes to be
positive because of the improved technical level. The trade-off between
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